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REINTRODUCING INTENT INTO PREDATORY 
PRICING LAW 
ABSTRACT 
Predatory pricing occupies a strange position in the antitrust laws. 
Normally, low prices are one of the major goals of antitrust law because they 
reflect competition and are generally beneficial to consumers. However, in 
some situations, the antitrust laws condemn prices that are too low as 
predatory: a company may be able to set prices arbitrarily low to gain 
monopoly power by excluding rivals or forcing them to acquiesce to its price 
leadership, and the company may then charge monopoly prices to the 
detriment of consumers. Separating normal, competitive low prices from 
predatory low prices is a difficult task, which, if not managed correctly, may 
completely frustrate the purpose of the antitrust laws. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., courts used wide-ranging standards to distinguish 
between competitive low prices and anticompetitive predatory prices. The 
Court’s decision foreclosed some more holistic standards by mandating two 
prerequisites for any predatory pricing claim: (1) below-cost pricing and (2) 
feasibility of recoupment. Despite the fact that Brooke Group did not foreclose 
other elements or considerations, courts have tended to treat its prerequisites 
as dispositive. This Comment argues that such an interpretation has resulted in 
an overly inclusive rule that is likely to become increasingly problematic given 
recent scholarship advocating expansion of the scope of the current doctrine. 
Current law is missing a key element that should be required for any predatory 
pricing claim: predatory intent. This Comment argues that adding an intent 
element to the current doctrine would be perfectly consistent with Brooke 
Group and, more broadly, with policies underlying antitrust law. Properly 
implemented, an intent requirement would add clarity to existing law by 
producing a theoretically complete definition of predatory pricing and would 
provide an important limiting principle on the scope of the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Small Town is home to four grocery stores and five gasoline filling 
stations.1 Local Grocery, a regional subsidiary of National Grocery, operates 
two of the grocery stores. Each of its two stores operates a gas station. Gas 
Filling Services, a regional gasoline wholesaler, operates two of the town’s gas 
stations. Ray’s Filling Station operates the remaining gas station. Ray’s is a 
privately owned, local business that has been in operation for thirty-five years. 
Several years ago, Local Grocery began a promotion it called the “Grocery 
Discount Program.” Under the program, customers could earn discounts at its 
gas stations based on the amount they spent at its grocery stores. For the first 
few months of the program, customers who purchased $25–$49.99 in groceries 
earned $0.04 per gallon off the posted price of gas, and customers who 
purchased $50 or more earned an $0.08-per-gallon discount. After the first few 
months, Local Grocery changed the terms so that a purchase of $35 or more 
earned a $0.15-per-gallon discount. Ten months later it deepened the discounts 
again: a purchase of $50 or more earned a $0.20-per-gallon discount. The 
program was wildly popular among Local Grocery’s customers. 
However, the program was not popular with Gas Filling Services and Ray’s 
Filling Station. They could not keep pace with Local Grocery’s low gas prices, 
and they lost a significant amount of money as a result. After thirty-six years of 
operation, Ray’s Filling Station was forced to shut down. Gas Filling Services 
and Ray’s Filling Station take issue not only with the effect of Local Grocery’s 
discount program on their profit margins but also with its legality. They file an 
antitrust lawsuit against Local Grocery, alleging that it attempted to 
monopolize the local gas filling business through a scheme of predatory 
pricing. If Gas Filling Services and Ray’s Filling Station prevail, they are 
entitled to treble damages.2 
Small Town’s story illustrates the central difficulty in predatory pricing 
law. Normally, antitrust laws are aimed at encouraging low prices because they 
 
 1 This fact pattern is based on Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2008). Note that 
this case was brought under Colorado’s Unfair Practices Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -117 (2011), 
rather than under federal antitrust laws. Parish Oil Co., 523 F.3d at 1247. This Comment deals only with 
federal antitrust laws. The issues, however, are essentially the same. 
 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
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reflect competitive markets and benefit consumers.3 However, predatory 
pricing doctrine recognizes that, in some situations, low prices are harmful to 
competition and to consumers. Companies may artificially lower prices to 
achieve monopoly power and thereafter charge supracompetitive prices to the 
detriment of the public.4 The problem arises in attempting to separate 
competitive low prices from anticompetitive low prices that are likely to lead 
to a monopoly. From the information available, the Small Town scenario 
seems consistent with each.5 
But how do we go about separating competitive low prices, which are the 
very goal of the antitrust laws, from anticompetitive predatory prices, which 
the antitrust laws forbid? It would seem logical to begin with a clear definition 
of what constitutes predatory pricing and then to develop rules for determining 
when prices fit that definition. However, this is not how the law has developed. 
Courts and commentators have instead worked backwards, developing various 
tools for identifying when low prices have anticompetitive effects without first 
agreeing on any one definition of a predatory pricing scheme.6 As a result, 
courts have used fairly wide-ranging standards for assessing predatory pricing 
claims.7 The Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. foreclosed some of these standards by making clear 
that a predatory pricing claim must satisfy two prerequisites: (1) prices were 
below some measure of cost (though it declined to specify the appropriate 
measure), and (2) it was feasible that the alleged predator could recoup the 
initial losses it sustained by pricing below cost.8 The second prerequisite is 
important because, if it is not met, a predatory scheme would not be profitable. 
Because of the flexibility of the Brooke Group prerequisites, the decision 
 
 3 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 3–7 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining why, as a matter of basic economic theory, competitive markets 
are a chief goal of antitrust law). 
 4 See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 723a, at 22 (3d ed. 2008). 
 5 The fact that Local Grocery’s discount program ran Ray’s Filling Station out of business is not 
particularly relevant. The antitrust laws are aimed at protecting “competition, not competitors.” Brooke Grp. 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis omitted)). In other words, harming competitors through low prices 
is perfectly compatible with normal competition. 
 6 See infra Part I.C. 
 7 See generally MARGARET C. LING ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, PREDATORY PRICING LAW: A CIRCUIT-BY-
CIRCUIT SURVEY 20–70 (Barbara O. Bruckman ed., 1995) (explaining the standards utilized by each of the 
federal circuits). 
 8 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24. 
SHARPES GALLEYS4 7/5/2012 2:12 PM 
2012] REINTRODUCING INTENT INTO PREDATORY PRICING LAW 907 
really only foreclosed more holistic standards9 and did not mandate that its two 
prerequisites were to be the only elements of a predatory pricing claim. 
However, since Brooke Group, the overwhelming tendency of courts has been 
to hold that these prerequisites are necessary and sufficient to establish the 
existence of predatory pricing.10 
This Comment argues that this interpretation is misguided. This Comment 
argues that courts should add a third requirement—predatory intent—and that 
doing so would be perfectly consistent with Brooke Group. The Comment 
proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a background on the role of predatory 
pricing in the antitrust laws and describes the current status of the law. Part II 
identifies problems with the current law and predatory pricing doctrine 
generally. It also briefly discusses several other proposals for reforming the 
law and considers how these proposals may contribute to the problem in the 
future. Part III identifies intent as the element lacking in current analyses and 
discusses the role of intent in the law before and after Brooke Group. Finally, 
Part IV argues that intent should be explicitly required as an element of any 
predatory pricing claim. This final part clarifies the concept of intent and 
argues that requiring this element would be more faithful to antitrust law and 
policy, and would provide an important limiting principle on the scope of the 
law. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE AND STATUS OF PREDATORY PRICING LAW 
Since their inception, the antitrust laws have condemned the practice of 
predatory pricing.11 While predatory pricing’s illegality has long been a part of 
the American legal tradition, there has been, and remains, much confusion 
about the legal and practical limits of the formal predatory pricing doctrine.12 
Then-Professor Easterbrook once suggested that “we have so many theories [of 
 
 9 See, e.g., McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1502 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining a 
standard under which predatory intent is determinative and the relation between price and cost merely allocates 
the burden). 
 10 See infra Part III.B. 
 11 LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 9–10 (stating the difficulty early cases had in defining predatory pricing). 
 12 See id. at 1 (discussing the difficulty of defining the doctrine); Daniel A. Crane, The Perverse Effects 
of Predatory Pricing Law, REG., Winter 2005–2006, at 26, 26 (“In the early years . . . courts frequently used 
conclusory epithets . . . to condemn price-cutting by dominant firms without undertaking any meaningful 
inquiry . . . .”); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 
284 (1977) (“Until recently predatory pricing has been a relatively vague concept in antitrust law. This may be 
because emotive terms, such as predatory pricing, do not invite and sometimes defy analysis.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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predatory pricing] for the same reason that 600 years ago there were a 
thousand positions on what dragons looked like.”13 While such a suggestion is 
hyperbole, it does illustrate the elusiveness of the concept. This Part introduces 
that concept: section A discusses its role within the antitrust laws, section B 
discusses the applicable statutes, and section C provides a summary of the 
current framework for analyzing predatory pricing claims. 
A. The Role of Predatory Pricing in the Antitrust Laws 
The general idea of predatory pricing is that a company may monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, a market by setting its prices artificially low. By 
charging otherwise-unreasonably-low, nonremunerative prices, a company 
may exclude rivals or coerce them into following its prices, rather than 
continuing legitimate price competition.14 After a company gains monopoly 
power through this pricing strategy, it recoups the losses it incurred from the 
low prices by charging supracompetitive prices and realizing monopoly 
profits.15 The antitrust laws target this behavior because of its anticompetitive 
effects.16 
The difficulty with predatory pricing doctrine is that, in many ways, it 
seems to be at odds with the objectives of antitrust law: ensuring vigorous 
competition and low prices for consumers.17 Aggressive price reductions—
even those that eliminate competitors—are generally thought to be pro-
competitive and thus beneficial to consumers.18 Predatory pricing obscures this 
notion and often seems to confuse the preservation of competitors with the 
preservation of competition.19 This obfuscation of antitrust policy has led one 
 
 13 Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 
(1981). 
 14 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id.; see also A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1399 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he gravamen [of predatory pricing] is that the aggressor sold goods for too little money, hoping to cripple 
or discipline rivals so that it might sell its wares for a monopoly price later, recouping the losses and adding a 
hefty profit, to the detriment of consumers.”); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for 
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 220–21 (1979) (“The primary objective of antitrust 
policy is to promote full and fair market competition and to reap the benefits that competition brings with it. 
Stated in negative terms, the goal is to discourage monopoly, monopolization, and associated monopoly 
behavior and the inefficiencies they generate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 17 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50–51 (1978); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 50–51 (3d ed. 2005). 
 18 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1993). 
 19 See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 221. 
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commentator to conclude that “[p]redatory pricing is a paradoxical offense.”20 
Determining the proper reach of the doctrine so as to square it with the rest of 
antitrust law is essentially the problem that has plagued courts and 
commentators. 
Some scholars—notably those belonging to the Chicago School—have 
argued for the outright rejection of the doctrine, suggesting that predatory 
pricing strategies are irrational and virtually nonexistent.21 In their views, such 
a strategy is unlikely to be profitable for a number of reasons. For a firm to 
employ a strategy of predation, it would have to incur substantial losses by 
selling below cost for a potentially significant period of time.22 Losses would 
be compounded by the fact that, by cutting prices, the firm would 
simultaneously be expanding output.23 Furthermore, the firm’s entire plan 
would hinge on its ability to recoup these losses by charging supracompetitive 
prices for some duration thereafter, which would be difficult because (1) 
consumers might thwart its efforts by stockpiling in the low-price period, (2) 
new entry into the monopolized market would be relatively easy unless barriers 
to entry were high, and (3) the amount recouped would have to be great 
enough to offset the loss of the time value of its predatory investment and the 
uncertainty that its strategy would be effective.24 Given the difficulties inherent 
in employing a strategy of predatory pricing, this group of scholars concluded 
that such a strategy is very unlikely to be employed, and because it is very 
difficult to distinguish predatory strategies from ordinary competition, it is not 
worth attempting to police the practice: recognizing predatory pricing claims 
would be more likely to protect competitors than to protect competition.25 
Other scholars argued that, despite the potential difficulties the doctrine 
presents, the anticompetitive effect of the practice brings it within the proper 
scope of the antitrust laws.26 Rather than dispensing with the doctrine, these 
scholars sought to establish rules that would enable courts to distinguish 
 
 20 Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
 21 E.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137, 
142–43 (1958); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586–89 (1994). 
 22 See BORK, supra note 17, at 148–49; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 268, 275; McGee, supra note 21, at 
139. 
 23 See BORK, supra note 17, at 149; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 268. 
 24 BORK, supra note 17, at 149–52; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 269–75. 
 25 BORK, supra note 17, at 154–55; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 333–37. 
 26 See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975). 
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between predatory strategies and ordinary competition.27 More recently, some 
commentators have perceived that predatory pricing, far from being a rarity, is 
actually quite prevalent and have devised broader standards to combat it.28 In 
sum, scholarship relating to the proper scope of predatory pricing law is all 
over the map. However, the mainstream view is that predatory pricing is rare 
but that antitrust law does have a role in policing it.29 
B. Statutory Coverage 
The primary statutory provisions applicable to predatory pricing claims are 
section 2 of the Sherman Act30 and the Robinson–Patman Act.31 Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations.”32 “[T]o demonstrate attempted monopolization a 
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”33 
  
 
 27 See id. at 699–700 (“[W]e will attempt to formulate meaningful and workable tests for distinguishing 
between predatory and competitive pricing by examining the relationship between a firm’s costs and its 
prices.”); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 223 (“[T]he best way to assess whether current behavior is 
predatory is to evaluate its expected effects on long-run market outcomes.”); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing 
and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890 (1976) (summarizing proposed deviations from 
simple, cost-based rules); Williamson, supra note 12, at 306–15 (discussing the optimality of various potential 
rules). 
 28 E.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 
2262–74 (2000); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 941–43 (2002). 
 29 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226–27 (1993); AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22–23. 
 30 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 31 Robinson–Patman Antidiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)). These are not the only statutes under which predatory pricing claims might 
arise. For example, claims may also arise under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, e.g., E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 655 (1980) (considering litigation pursuant to section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45)), or under state unfair competition laws, e.g., Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (considering litigation pursuant to Colorado’s Unfair Practices Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 
to -117 (2011)). 
 32 15 U.S.C. § 2. Predatory pricing claims are most frequently brought as attempted monopolization 
cases, rather than as completed monopolization cases. See  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 724a, at 
36. For this reason, this Comment deals only with the former. 
 33 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
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The Robinson–Patman Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade 
and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition 
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit 
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.34 
Price discrimination does not have much meaning: it simply means a “price 
difference.”35 However, the Act does not prohibit all price differences—only 
those that threaten to injure competition or create a monopoly.36 Under the Act, 
there are two types of violations: primary-line violations and secondary-line 
violations. “Primary line violations are directed at injuring competition with 
the discriminating seller’s direct competitors, whereas secondary line 
violations are directed at injuring competition among the discriminating 
seller’s customers.”37 Though the vagueness of the respective statutes could 
lead to different applications of each, predatory pricing is essentially the same 
under either statute: a business has set unreasonably low prices to gain 
monopoly power by excluding or coercing rivals.38 The statutes, ultimately, 
provide little clarification.39 
C. Brooke Group and the Current Status of the Law 
With little statutory guidance, predatory pricing law has been mostly judge-
made and heavily influenced by academic proposals. A persisting problem 
with the development of the law is that courts and commentators have had 
difficulty even agreeing on a definition of predatory pricing.40 Rather than 
developing standards from a unified definition, courts have, over time, 
developed various tools for distinguishing between competitive and 
 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
 35 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993) (quoting Texaco 
Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558 (1990)). 
 36 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
 37 Able Sales Co. v. Compañía de Azúcar de P.R., 406 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 38 See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222; A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 
1399 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 39 The statutes, however, are somewhat useful in determining the proper limits of the doctrine even if 
they do not clarify exactly what the offense is. See infra Part IV. 
 40 See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 219. 
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anticompetitive prices.41 Three major tools developed: (1) analyzing the 
alleged predator’s price–cost relationship, (2) examining the market to 
determine whether recoupment was feasible, and (3) focusing on the alleged 
predator’s intent. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., courts employed wide-ranging 
standards that utilized some combination of these tools.42 
Most courts focused on whether the defendant’s prices were below its 
costs; however, there were a number of measures of costs that courts used.43 In 
a seminal article, Professors Areeda and Turner argued that the theoretically 
correct measure was marginal cost; prices below this measure, they argued, 
were economically irrational unless the firm was employing a predatory 
strategy.44 Because of the difficulties of measuring marginal cost, they 
proposed using average variable cost (AVC) as a proxy.45 However, other 
scholars criticized the Areeda–Turner rule on a number of grounds.46 As a 
result, the Areeda–Turner rule was influential but not uniformly embraced; 
instead, courts utilized a number of different measures of cost.47 In addition to 
the price–cost relationship, the recoupment inquiry gained traction as a 
relatively easy-to-employ filtering mechanism.48 And some courts utilized 
 
 41 See Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400–01 (reviewing various approaches developed by courts to 
distinguish between competitive and anticompetitive prices). 
 42 See infra Part III. 
 43 See Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400. See generally MARGARET C. LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 25–
70 (discussing the measures of cost used in each circuit). 
 44 Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 712–13. Marginal cost is the incremental cost of each additional 
unit of output; it is purely a function of variable costs. Id. at 700. 
 45 Id. at 716–17. AVC, as the name suggests, is “the sum of all variable costs divided by output.” Id. at 
700. 
 46 See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of 
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 2–4 (1979) (criticizing the “static analysis” of the Areeda–Turner rule for 
overlooking the “intertemporal” nature of predatory pricing); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 222 
(“[T]o dismiss entirely an assessment of long-run effects, as for example Areeda and Turner seem to do, is to 
dismiss the essence of the predatory pricing problem.” (footnote omitted)); Scherer, supra note 27, at 869 
(“[Areeda and Turner’s] analysis of what it means to set a price below marginal cost is imprecise and 
incompletely developed. . . . [It] leaves out important variables . . . .”); Williamson, supra note 12, at 285–86 
(“[The Areeda–Turner] marginal cost pricing rules . . . may not yield the immediate social welfare gains that 
Areeda and Turner attribute to them and, more importantly, . . . make no allowance for strategic behavior by 
dominant firms.”). 
 47 See generally MARGARET C. LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 25–70 (discussing the standards utilized in 
each circuit). 
 48 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 
1989); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16 at 222–23. 
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more holistic standards that used considerations such as intent as the ultimate 
touchstone for identifying predation.49 
Brooke Group settled some—and failed to settle other—disputes. It made 
clear that, whether a claim arises under the Sherman Act or the Robinson–
Patman Act, the law is essentially the same. Furthermore, it set out two 
prerequisites to recovery in any predatory pricing claim. Under Brooke Group, 
a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) set prices “below an appropriate 
measure of its . . . costs”50 and (2) had a “reasonable prospect” (under section 
2(a) of the Robinson–Patman Act), or “a dangerous probability” (under section 
2 of the Sherman Act), “of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”51 
The Court affirmed the court of appeals decision—upholding the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict—because the plaintiff, Liggett, failed to establish 
that Brown & Williamson had a reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory 
investment.52 The Court therefore emphasized to lower courts its earlier stated 
view that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely 
successful.”53 Its analysis suggested to courts that the bar in predatory pricing 
claims should be high;54 courts should be skeptical of predatory pricing claims 
and should scrutinize the feasibility of recoupment. However, the Court 
expressly declined to settle the split among the lower courts as to the 
appropriate measure of cost to consider.55 Furthermore, the Court only 
established pricing below cost and feasibility of recoupment as prerequisites, 
leaving open the status of other considerations.56 
Following Brooke Group, the overwhelming tendency of courts has been to 
hold that plaintiffs fail to satisfy the two prerequisites.57 As a result, the 
 
 49 See infra Part III for a more detailed discussion of the role of intent. 
 50 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993). 
 51 Id. at 224. 
 52 Id. at 231–32. 
 53 Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589). 
 54 See id. (“These prerequisites . . . are not easy to establish, but they are not artificial obstacles to 
recovery . . . .”). 
 55 See id. at 222 n.1 (“Because the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is average 
variable cost . . . we again decline to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the appropriate measure 
of cost.”). The circuits remain split as to what the appropriate measure of cost is to satisfy the first prong of the 
Brooke Group standard. Some follow the Areeda–Turner approach of using marginal cost (or average variable 
cost as a proxy), while others use average total cost or some other measure. Compare, e.g., Int’l Air Indus., 
Inc. v. Am. Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975) (using a short-run profit-maximizing test), with Spirit 
Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005) (using average variable cost). 
 56 See infra Part III for a discussion of the role of intent in predatory pricing claims after Brooke Group. 
 57 See Crane, supra note 20, at 4 (“[A]lthough it is accepted wisdom that no predatory pricing plaintiff 
has won a verdict since Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., plaintiffs have recently 
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Court’s standard has come under attack as being overly harsh and nearly 
impossible to satisfy.58 This Comment maintains that the Brooke Group 
standard does not set an artificially high bar for predatory pricing claims and is 
not overly harsh to plaintiffs. Quite the contrary: the Brooke Group standard is 
not exacting enough. The current standard sets out requirements that are—and 
should be—necessary for a predatory pricing claim but should not be 
sufficient. The current standard is therefore overly broad and risks condemning 
behavior that poses none of the risks of true predatory pricing. 
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH PREDATORY PRICING AND RECENT PROPOSALS 
Recent commentary has focused on the fact that, since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brooke Group, no plaintiff has ultimately succeeded in a claim of 
predatory pricing in the federal courts.59 As a result, it might be argued that 
any debate over predatory pricing law is now purely academic. However, there 
are several reasons to believe that the contours of predatory pricing law 
continue to have practical significance and pose substantial concerns. 
Conclusory statements that no plaintiff has prevailed since Brooke Group 
are somewhat misleading. Plaintiffs have won some cases in court and have 
obtained significant settlements in others.60 Furthermore, despite their low 
 
won some predatory pricing cases and procured substantial settlements in others.” (footnotes omitted)); Edlin, 
supra note 28, at 941 (“Since 1993, when the Supreme Court decided Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., no predatory pricing plaintiff has prevailed in a final determination in the federal 
courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 58 See, e.g., Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2241; Edlin, supra note 28, at 941–43. 
 59 Edlin, supra note 28, at 941; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 
2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 312; Kimberly L. Herb, Note, The Predatory Pricing Puzzle: Piecing 
Together a Unitary Standard, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2007). There are at least a couple of 
reasons to believe that this does not indicate an overly rigid doctrine. First, plaintiffs’ lack of success may 
reflect judges’ skepticism about predatory pricing claims more than a strict legal standard. Second, because of 
the potentially ruinous size of verdicts in such cases, parties faced with an adverse judgment have a strong 
incentive to settle. Indeed, a good many have. See Crane, supra note 20, at 16 (explaining the inducement to 
settle, noting that “many predatory pricing lawsuits are so-called bet-the-company events”). 
 60 See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M (Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.), 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(noting a $22.8 million jury verdict, trebled to $68.5 million plus interest, in the trial court); Kinetic Concepts, 
Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725–26 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (noting a $173.6 million jury 
verdict that would have been trebled to $520.8 million, but the case was dismissed upon settlement); 
Brunswick to Settle Pricing Suits for $65 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at C4 (noting a company’s 
agreement to pay $65 million to settle predatory pricing lawsuits); Harlan S. Byrne, In a Real Fix, BARRON’S, 
Oct. 2, 1995, at 16, 16 (reporting that, after a trial court awarded Thermex Energy $488 million in a suit 
against ICI Explosives and Dyno Industries, ICI settled for $36 million and Dyno settled for an undisclosed 
amount); Vicki Vaughan, Family Feud—Centeno Heirs Battle to Control Ruins of Bankrupt Grocery Chain, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 2, 1996, at J1 (reporting a $6.5 million settlement between two grocery 
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success rate, a large number of claims have been filed since the decision.61 
This fact is significant for two reasons. First, the filings themselves make 
debate about the proper boundaries of predatory pricing law significant 
because the potential awards are so great—perhaps in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars, if not greater.62 Awards are prone to being especially large because 
of treble damages and the fact that plaintiffs are automatically entitled to 
receive attorney’s fees.63 With such large potential verdicts, the risk of an 
erroneous judgment is great.64 Second, the fact that plaintiffs continue to file 
predatory pricing claims with little hope of prevailing suggests that plaintiffs 
are making these claims for other reasons.  
One commentator suggests that plaintiffs can “win without winning”65 by 
“strategically misus[ing] predatory pricing law”66 either to force a defendant-
competitor to raise its prices or to implement a scheme of tacit collusion.67 For 
example, a less efficient plaintiff might threaten or bring a predatory pricing 
case against its more efficient competitor, using the threat of expensive 
litigation and a potential adverse judgment to cause its competitor to cease a 
course of price competition.68 If the threat does not work, the expenses of 
litigation may raise the defendant’s costs to the extent that it is forced to raise 
its prices anyway.69 Such a strategy could likely be employed successfully 
even though the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in court is low—and is even 
 
stores); Mark L. Kovner—Partner, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm? 
contentID=220&itemID=7912 (last visited July 5, 2012) (reporting a “very favorable settlement” for Beech-
Nut Nutrition Corporation in a predatory pricing suit against Gerber Products Company following a Ninth 
Circuit opinion in Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Products Co., 69 F. App’x 350 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 61 Crane, supra note 20, at 6–8. At least fifty-seven claims had been filed as of 2005, and Crane estimates 
that the true number could be in the hundreds. Id. at 8 n.19. 
 62 See supra note 60; see also Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
218 (1993) (reversing a $49.6 million jury verdict, which trebled to $148.8 million); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. 
AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1160 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing a $1.8 billion judgment, which was based on a 
number of antitrust claims, including predatory pricing). 
 63 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
 64 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723b, at 24. 
 65 Crane, supra note 12, at 27. 
 66 Crane, supra note 20, at 6. 
 67 Id. at 5, 16–17. 
 68 Id. at 9. If the threat is credible, a firm might quite reasonably conclude that raising its prices would be 
less costly than engaging in litigation. Id. For the threat to be credible, the potential defendant has to believe 
that the case would be more costly to it than to the potential plaintiff. Id. at 10–11. It may believe this for 
several reasons: (1) loss aversion (or tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains), (2) potential 
reputational harm from an antitrust lawsuit that may have adverse market effects, (3) potential for plaintiffs to 
hire lawyers on contingency (in contrast to the defendants), and (4) inherent asymmetry in the costs of antitrust 
litigation. Id. at 10–13. 
 69 See id. at 12. 
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perceived as such. The defendant firm must only perceive the expected cost of 
the litigation and a potential adverse judgment as less costly than relenting on 
price70—not too tall an order given the high litigation costs and the large size 
of potential judgments.71 
Additionally, a plaintiff may use a predatory pricing claim to set the stage 
for a scheme of tacit collusion. In a normal market, coordination of prices 
among competitors is thwarted by uncertainty over each other’s competitive 
data and the incentive to—or suspicion that others will—cheat (i.e., 
unilaterally vary from a coordinated price).72 Predatory pricing litigation 
removes many of the impediments to the successful implementation of such a 
scheme. A complaint itself may serve as a legal means of price signaling “by 
providing a detailed specification of the plaintiff’s objections to the 
defendant’s present pricing structure,”73 and discovery facilitates the detailed 
exchange of revenue, cost, and other competitive data, removing uncertainty 
about competitors’ present and future pricing strategies and capabilities.74 
Finally, the courts themselves provide a policing mechanism by monitoring the 
defendants’ pricing behaviors and sometimes enjoining them, at least pending 
resolution of the dispute, from lowering prices below a certain rate.75 Thus, 
there is a very real possibility that plaintiffs sometimes file illegitimate 
predatory pricing claims to achieve supracompetitive pricing schemes 
antithetical to antitrust law, and that the laxity of the law contributes to the 
success of such strategies. 
There is also substantial risk of David-versus-Goliath-type rhetoric being 
employed to punish firms simply for being large.76 For various reasons 
completely unrelated to predatory pricing—including economies of scale, 
 
 70 Id.; Crane, supra note 12, at 27–28. 
 71 See supra notes 60, 62. 
 72 See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS 
ORIGINS 64–65 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the problems faced by cartels in implementing schemes of price 
collusion). 
 73 Crane, supra note 20, at 17. 
 74 Id. at 17–19. 
 75 Id. at 19–20; see also Am. Bldg. Prods., L.L.C. v. Ashley Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-2976, 1997 
WL 610877, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 1997) (granting a temporary restraining order prohibiting an aggressor 
company from lowering prices while the case proceeded); Advantage Publ’ns, Inc. v. Daily Press, Inc., No. 83-
72-NN, 1983 WL 1829, at *9 (E.D. Va. May 23, 1983) (setting conditions of conducting business for the 
defendant company in a predatory pricing suit). 
 76 See  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22–23 (noting “exaggerated fears” that large 
companies engage in predatory pricing); BORK, supra note 17, at 4–7 (discussing the influence of “populist 
hostility to big business” on antitrust law and its enforcement). 
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vertical integration, and synergies unavailable to smaller companies—large 
companies can often produce products at much lower prices than smaller 
companies.77 At trial, fact finders are unlikely to take these factors into account 
and may be inclined to hold large-company defendants liable based on their 
size.78 This danger is particularly acute if the law is overly generous to 
plaintiffs.79 A study of jurors in several antitrust trials—including Brooke 
Group—is telling. Interviews of these jurors revealed that they were 
completely confused by the underlying law and testimony and that they lacked 
even a basic grasp of the relevant concepts.80 From these interviews, the study 
concluded that the jury verdict in Brooke Group in particular was based largely 
on factors other than legal or factual justifications, including the populist 
sentiments of some of the jurors.81 
While a number of suggestions have been made for alleviating some of the 
current problems with predatory pricing—limiting or eliminating competitor 
standing, eliminating the remedy of treble damages, implementing a scheme of 
fee shifting (specifically a loser-pays system), and bifurcating the discovery 
process82—they offer incomplete solutions. Furthermore, recent commentary 
seems likely to expand the scope of the current law. It has emphasized that 
more modern economic theory and more recent empirical studies—relying on 
more sophisticated techniques—suggest that predatory pricing is much more 
prevalent than previously thought.83 They have therefore proposed various 
 
 77 See MORGAN, supra note 72, at 17–18. 
 78 Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 51, 55–56 (1995). 
 79 See BORK, supra note 17, at 5 (“Unless the theory of antitrust is understood and the law brought into 
line with it, the law will surely move on again, becoming even more unnecessarily restrictive of business 
freedom.”); Crane, supra note 20, at 46–47 (noting the importance of courts in preventing the potential bias of 
juries against large corporations from effecting false positives in predatory pricing claims). 
 80 Austin, supra note 78, at 52–59. 
 81 Id. at 55–57. For an earlier study of the outcomes of predatory pricing cases, see Roland H. Koller II, 
The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105. The 
study concluded that, out of twenty-three cases studied in which the defendant was found to have engaged in 
predatory pricing, the defendant had only attempted a predatory pricing strategy in seven and was successful in 
even fewer. Id. at 112. 
 82 See Crane, supra note 20, at 59–64; Crane, supra note 12, at 28–31. For a general discussion of the 
appropriateness of competitor standing in predatory pricing cases, see  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 
¶ 723e, at 33–35. Note that, if courts begin to recognize new, strategic theories of predation, limiting 
competitor standing may be particularly appropriate because such theories assume imperfect information. It 
would be somewhat contradictory to place no limits on claims that rivals priced below cost when the theory of 
predation underlying the claim assumes that they lack knowledge of their rivals’ true costs. 
 83 See Malcolm R. Burns, New Evidence on Predatory Price Cutting, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
ECON. 327 (1989) (stating that business letters discovered in the trial records of United States v. American 
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), econometric evidence of the Tobacco trust’s behavior, and game-
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standards for broadening the current scope of the law to deter predatory 
schemes. Some have proposed essentially scrapping the current law to allow 
predatory pricing to encompass even above-cost price cuts where they may 
result in limited competition and fewer choices for consumers.84 Other 
proposals have been less radical, working more within the Brooke Group 
framework. For example, one proposal advocates applying a practical test to 
the below-cost inquiry that would rely on the defendant’s own financial data to 
reconstruct its calculations of its costs instead of relying on various theoretical 
measures of cost.85 Another proposal suggests recognizing several new 
theories as plausible predatory strategies, including financial-market predation 
and predation based on several signaling theories.86 Under financial-market 
predation, a firm may lower prices to an otherwise-rational level to harm 
competitors’ profits and make lending to them risky—or at least appear to 
be—to frighten away investors, thereby excluding rivals and deterring entry.87 
Various signaling theories of predation would recognize that firms are 
sometimes able to use price cuts to send messages to rivals or potential rivals 
that have the effect of excluding them or deterring entry.88 At the same time, it 
would recognize a more robust and clearly defined business-justification 
defense “as a necessary shield against an overly inclusive legal rule.”89 So 
while recent proposals have not been one-sided, they have reflected a belief 
that predatory pricing is more prevalent than it was previously thought to be 
and have advocated greatly expanding the current scope of the law. 
Recent scholarship is likely to influence the courts; in fact, it may already 
be doing so. For example, in United States v. AMR Corp., the Tenth Circuit 
 
theoretical models of oligopoly demonstrate the rationality and plausibility of predatory strategies); David 
Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar Industry, 1887–1914, 37 RAND 
J. ECON. 47, 47–48 (2006); Fiona Scott Morton, Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929, 6 
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 679, 680–81 (1997) (arguing that an empirical analysis of British shipping 
companies’ behaviors around the turn of the nineteenth century suggests the prevalence of predatory 
strategies); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of 
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 699–708 (1982). 
 84 See, e.g., Edlin, supra note 28, at 945–47, 963 (proposing a rule that would require an incumbent 
monopolist to freeze its prices following a significant new entry until the entrant is able to gain footing in the 
market). 
 85 Herb, supra note 59, at 1604–05. 
 86 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2248–49. 
 87 Id. at 2285–90. 
 88 Id. at 2299–312. For example, under test-market predation, a predator may cut prices when a 
competitor attempts a limited entry to evaluate a potential market. By doing so, it can thwart the potential 
competitor’s efforts and discourage entry. Id. at 2311–12. 
 89 Id. at 2274. 
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stated that “[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion that predatory 
pricing schemes are implausible and irrational” and that, because of these 
developments, it would no longer approach claims of predatory pricing “with 
the incredulity that once prevailed.”90 These shifting perceptions threaten to 
make predatory pricing claims more prominent, which may increase the risk of 
erroneous judgments for plaintiffs. They therefore necessitate a careful 
consideration of the proper scope of the doctrine. The practice may be rare, and 
there may be difficulties in separating it from ordinary competition; however, 
there is evidence that such strategies are both plausible and actually utilized.91 
Where present, such behavior hinders competition and leads to monopolistic 
results: higher long-term prices, fewer choices for consumers, and reduced 
incentive to innovate. 
As the consistency of some of these recent proposals with the Brooke 
Group standard suggests, the perceived rigidness of the current law is less a 
matter of a strict standard than it is of judicial skepticism about the plausibility 
of predatory pricing.92 Signs that judges are no longer as skeptical as they once 
were and suggestions for expanding the scope of the current law may therefore 
be problematic. This Comment argues that the current law is overly broad in 
one key respect: its failure to consider predatory intent. The next Part discusses 
the role intent has played in predatory pricing analysis before and after Brooke 
Group, and Part IV proposes that intent be added as a third requirement to 
provide a limitation on the current scope of the law. 
III.  THE ROLE OF INTENT BEFORE AND AFTER BROOKE GROUP 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Brooke Group, the circuits were widely 
split on the issue of the proper role of intent in predatory pricing analysis. 
Section A summarizes the state of the law before the decision, focusing on four 
important circuit court decisions split between two polar-opposite views. 
Review of these cases reveals some of the major arguments on either side of 
the intent debate as well as the general lack of clarity that existed on the 
matter. Section B then discusses the effect Brooke Group had on the role of 
intent, focusing on its legal and practical ramifications. 
 
 90 335 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 91 See supra note 83; see also Robert D. Joffe, Antitrust Law and Proof of Consumer Injury, 75 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 615, 625 (2001). 
 92 See Kenneth L. Glazer, Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 
605, 626 (1994) (noting that Brooke Group allows courts to follow their own convictions about the presence of 
predation). 
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A. Intent Before Brooke Group 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group, there was a 
substantial split of authority over the role of intent in predatory pricing law. 
Scholars had divided on the issue for some time. Some argued for largely per 
se rules that focused exclusively on economic analysis,93 while others argued 
that consideration of intent was important to the complex analyses that were 
required to properly implement the goals of antitrust enforcement.94 In the 
years leading up to Brooke Group, several circuits considered the problem, and 
two held intent to be an important component, while two essentially discarded 
any consideration of intent in evaluating predatory pricing claims.95 
Commentators aligned on both sides of the split.96 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. 
v. ITT Continental Baking Co.97 Plaintiff Inglis, a northern-California 
wholesale bakery, claimed that Continental, a large, national wholesale baker, 
engaged in predatory pricing in the market for private-label bread.98 The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant employed this scheme to obtain monopoly 
power in the private-label-bread market, which it could leverage to reduce the 
competitive disadvantage of its advertised-label bread.99 As a result of the 
 
 93 E.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 697–98, 732–33. 
 94 E.g., Scherer, supra note 27, at 868–69, 890. 
 95 Compare William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1033–36 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (requiring intent), and McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504–05 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(upholding the intent requirement), with Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 
1983) (rejecting the intent requirement), and A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 
1396, 1402–03 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 96 Compare, e.g., Steven R. Beck, Note, Intent as an Element of Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1242, 1242 (1991) (“A complete test for predatory pricing must 
consider intent.”), with Michael C. Quinn, Note, Predatory Pricing Strategies: The Relevance of Intent Under 
Antitrust, Unfair Competition, and Tort Law, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 607, 628 (1990) (arguing that federal 
antitrust law should not consider evidence of intent and that state unfair-competition and tort laws provide 
alternatives for plaintiffs relying on this type of evidence). 
 97 668 F.2d 1014. 
 98 Id. at 1024. 
 99 Id. at 1024–25. Private-label bread is essentially generic-brand bread: it is produced by wholesale 
bakers and marketed under a retailer’s label. Id. at 1024. Advertised-label bread is brand-name bread that is 
generally available to all retailers. Id. A wholesaler’s private- and advertised-label breads are essentially the 
same products, with the key difference being their respective prices. Id. Advertised-label bread commands a 
higher price and thus a larger profit margin for the wholesaler. Id. Inglis essentially alleged that Continental 
engaged in a predatory pricing scheme so that it could eliminate competition in the less profitable private-label 
market so that it could raise prices in the market and cause retailers to purchase more advertised-label bread at 
higher prices and profit margins. Id. at 1024–25. 
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alleged scheme, Inglis incurred substantial losses in the private-label-bread 
market and eventually ceased operations, bringing suit just prior to doing so. 
At trial, Inglis presented both market- and intent-based evidence. With 
respect to the market dynamics, Inglis showed that the defendant had cut its 
prices per loaf over the alleged predatory period—first from $0.19 to $0.18, 
and then to $0.172—and thereafter gradually increased prices, allegedly when 
it realized Inglis was about to go out of business.100 Inglis showed that these 
prices were below the defendant’s costs; it established that the defendant had 
incurred substantial losses over this period and introduced expert testimony 
that the defendant’s prices over this period were below its average variable 
costs.101 Inglis’s intent-based evidence consisted of (1) an independent 
consultant’s report identifying pricing “to hasten wholesaler exit” as one 
possible means of combating private-label competition;102 (2) “reports by 
Continental salesmen targeting Inglis private label accounts for enhanced 
competitive efforts”;103 and (3) a memorandum written by the manager of one 
of Continental’s regional bakeries in 1974, which opined that Inglis would 
likely go out of business within the year.104 In response, Continental argued 
that (1) the wholesale-bread market in northern California was extremely 
competitive and that Continental itself lacked market power; (2) that the 
innovation of “‘captive’ bakeries,” or in-store bakeries, increased competitive 
pressure in the market during the relevant period; and (3) that federally 
imposed price freezes accounted for its below-cost pricing and that the 
termination of these freezes led to its subsequent price increases.105 The jury 
returned a verdict for Inglis, but the district court granted defendant’s motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.106 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.107 It emphasized 
that an attempt claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act requires three 
elements—“(1) specific intent to control prices or destroy competition . . . ; (2) 
predatory or anticompetitive conduct . . . ; and (3) a dangerous probability of 
success”108—before settling on a primarily intent-based standard for predatory 
 
 100 Id. at 1025. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1025 n.2. 
 105 Id. at 1025–26. 
 106 Id. at 1024. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 1027. 
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pricing claims.109 The court held “that to establish predatory pricing a plaintiff 
must prove that the anticipated benefits of defendant’s price depended on its 
tendency to discipline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm’s 
long-term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power.”110 This meant that 
the ultimate standard was whether “the justification [for a firm’s prices was 
based] . . . on their tendency to eliminate rivals and create a market structure 
enabling the seller to recoup his losses.”111 The plaintiff would bear the burden 
of showing the defendant’s prices were predatory if the defendant’s prices 
were below average total cost but above average variable cost, while the 
burden would shift to the defendant to justify its prices if the plaintiff showed 
them to be below average variable cost.112 Thus, the court justified its rule by 
tying it into the specific intent required for all section 2 attempt claims, a 
requirement that developed by analogy to the law of criminal attempt and was 
seen as necessary to confine the reach of the claim to conduct that threatened 
monopolization.113 It further justified its intent-based standard as a way to 
distinguish between anticompetitive predatory prices, which are the proper 
subject of antitrust law, and ordinary, competitive ones that should not be 
constrained.114 Nonetheless, the court did express some misgivings about 
relying too heavily on evidence of intent. Specifically, it noted that direct 
evidence of intent often does not correspond to whether there was indeed an 
antitrust violation: savvy firms are careful not to leave evidence of any 
improper intent, and statements that evince ordinary competitive desires may 
be easily distorted.115 The court sought to avoid these pitfalls by requiring 
corroborative conduct.116 
However, the court found little evidence of predatory intent in the case at 
hand. It dismissed the consultant’s report because, “[r]easonably interpreted, it 
amount[ed] to no more than a recommendation of intensified price 
competition,”117 and the mere suggestion of the idea in the consultant’s report 
 
 109 See id. at 1035–36. 
 110 Id. at 1035. 
 111 Id. The court identified only one nonpredatory justification for pricing below cost: cost minimization. 
See id. 
 112 Id. at 1035–36. 
 113 See id. at 1027. 
 114 See id. at 1031 & n.18. 
 115 See id. at 1028 & n.6. 
 116 Id. at 1028. 
 117 Id. at 1039. 
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did not indicate that it was ever considered or adopted by Continental.118 Apart 
from the consultant’s report, the court found little evidence of unlawful intent 
and thus held that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a 
new trial.”119 
The Eleventh Circuit also maintained an intent requirement in McGahee v. 
Northern Propane Gas Co.120 McGahee involved a claim of predation by a 
new entrant into the Camilla, Georgia-area propane-gas market against an 
established firm with a large market share.121 The plaintiff, McGahee, had 
served as the defendant Northern’s district manager for some time but resigned 
following a demotion.122 After leaving the company, he started his own 
propane business in direct competition with the defendant and at least initially 
was successful at acquiring a significant share of the market from the 
defendant.123 The competition led to a price war during which, the plaintiff 
claimed, the defendant had engaged in predatory pricing.124 The plaintiff 
alleged that Northern sold propane at prices below average total cost and, 
during some months, below average variable cost.125 He further presented 
evidence that Northern sold propane at lower prices in Camilla than in other 
areas and that part of its price reductions consisted of providing propane tanks 
to customers rent free.126 Among the documents McGahee introduced was an 
internal document in which Northern’s district manager referred to the plaintiff 
as “Floyd The S.O.B.” and established “[c]ontribut[ing] to Floyd’s financial 
problems” as a yearly goal.127 The district court was not persuaded and granted 
summary judgment for Northern.128 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding 
that “the test for predatory pricing must consider subjective evidence and 
should use average total cost as the cost above which no inference of predatory 
intent can be made.”129 
 
 118 Id. at 1038–39. The court specifically declined to rule on the admissibility of the report into evidence. 
Id. at 1039 n.41. 
 119 Id. at 1039. 
 120 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 121 Id. at 1491–92. 
 122 Id. at 1491. 
 123 Id. at 1492. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128 Id. at 1491. 
 129 Id. at 1496 (footnote omitted). 
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In crafting its standard, the court disapproved of reliance on academic 
commentary and instead focused on the antitrust statutes, their legislative 
history, and recent Supreme Court precedent.130 It concluded that Congress 
intended a defendant’s subjective intent to be an important consideration for 
several reasons. First, the Sherman Act was a criminal statute codifying and 
expanding the common law with proof of substantive violations requiring a 
showing of specific intent.131 Second, the legislative background of public 
outcry in 1890 against monopolies demonstrated “Congressional concern with 
the economic and political power of large combinations and with restraining 
harmful but not all competition.”132 Finally, discussions surrounding the 
enactment of the Robinson–Patman Act indicated that Congress intended to 
distinguish among different purposes for price cuts and differentials.133 The 
court thus formulated an intent-based standard in which costs were a means of 
implementing presumptions and allocating the burden of proof: prices above 
average total cost could not be predatory, prices below short-run marginal cost 
carried a rebuttable presumption of predatory intent, and prices between those 
two measures created a permissible inference of predatory intent.134 Applying 
this standard, the court found there to be a genuine issue of material fact and 
reversed the district court’s decision.135 McGahee had presented evidence that 
Northern’s prices were below average total cost along with several pieces of 
evidence that—at least conjunctively—the court found could support a finding 
of predatory intent. This evidence included Northern’s investigation of 
McGahee’s financials, Northern’s new policy of rent-free tanks aimed at taking 
advantage of McGahee’s financial position, and Northern’s internal 
memorandum.136 
The First Circuit addressed the issue in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell 
Corp.,137 becoming the first to reject an intent requirement. Pacific, the 
defendant in Barry Wright, was a manufacturer of mechanical snubbers, or 
shock absorbers used in the construction of nuclear-power-plant pipe 
 
 130 See id. at 1496–1502. The court specifically declined to embrace the Areeda–Turner test, which it 
described as being “carved from economic assumptions, not from antitrust statutes and judicial precedents.” Id. 
at 1495–96. 
 131 Id. at 1500. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id. at 1503–04. 
 135 Id. at 1504–05. 
 136 Id. at 1504. 
 137 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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systems.138 Pacific was the only producer—domestic or foreign—of snubbers 
that met the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s standards139 and, by virtue of 
the lack of substitutes, had a 94% share of the domestic snubber market.140 
Grinnell, a maker and installer of nuclear pipe systems, purchased a large share 
of the mechanical snubbers sold in the United States.141 It entered into a 
development contract with the plaintiff, Barry Wright, under which it hoped to 
secure an alternative source of snubbers.142 Barry Wright’s production was 
delayed, and Pacific, recognizing the potential competition, offered Grinnell 
special discounts.143 Grinnell eventually discontinued its development contract 
with Barry Wright, and the latter filed suit, alleging that Pacific’s discounts 
amounted to predatory price cuts in violation of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.144  
The court rejected this claim, asserting a purely cost-based standard and 
finding that the plaintiff failed to meet it.145 The court expressed general 
disapproval of a subjective, intent-based approach, stating that it was too vague 
of a standard and suggesting that it would result in a futile search for “smoking 
gun” documents or statements.146 And, if direct evidence of intent were not 
required (i.e., if intent could be inferred from a firm’s conduct and the 
corresponding economic conditions), an application of Occam’s razor 
suggested that the requirement of intent should simply be eliminated.147 It 
therefore did so148 and found it unnecessary to delve into the intricacies of 
various measures of cost in order to dismiss the claim, because the prices 
involved exceeded both average and incremental costs and because “virtually 
every court and commentator agree[d]” that such prices were lawful.149 It 
concluded by expressly disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s standard, which 
“recognize[d] an economic circumstance in which even ‘above total cost’ price 
cutting might . . . hurt the consumer.”150  
 
 138 Id. at 229. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. at 229–31. 
 145 See id. at 232–36. 
 146 Id. at 232. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 233 (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 711.1c, at 118 (Supp. 
1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150 Id. 
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The court disavowed this possibility for several reasons. First, it asserted 
that such price cuts are almost certainly precompetitive.151 Second, it found 
that this suggestion was vague and might be construed to proscribe “limit 
pricing,” a common practice that it seemed to doubt antitrust laws should 
reach.152 Third, the court found it too difficult as a practical matter to 
distinguish between price cuts with competitive purposes and those with 
anticompetitive purposes.153 Finally, it deemed the business uncertainty and 
costs to be too high under such a rule.154 And though it rejected the rule, it 
concluded that the plaintiff would have failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s test 
because the discounts allowed Pacific to manage its excess capacity more 
efficiently and therefore were cost saving, a fact that precluded a finding of 
predatory intent.155 
The Seventh Circuit followed suit in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre 
Farms, Inc.156 In Rose Acre, the plaintiffs, several egg producers, claimed that 
the defendant, Rose Acre, engaged in predatory pricing by selling eggs to 
supermarkets below costs.157 Rose Acre was a vertically integrated firm: it 
managed all stages of production, from laying to grading, sorting, crating, and 
shipping.158 Many integrated egg producers sold surplus eggs that would 
otherwise go bad to “breakers,” or companies that would use the eggs for 
baked goods or other products.159 Rose Acre, however, sold its surplus eggs to 
supermarkets at reduced prices.160 Between 1978 and 1982, Rose Acre grew 
significantly, accounting for about 1% of national production, 8.6% in a five-
state region, and 23.1% in Indiana.161 Its growth came at the expense of at least 
some of its rivals, who brought suit.162  
They alleged that Rose Acre sold at proportionally lower prices to 
supermarkets located farther away, although transportation costs were higher, 
and that its prices were below average total cost—and below average variable 
 
 151 Id. at 234. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See id. at 234–35. 
 154 Id. at 235. 
 155 See id. at 236. 
 156 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 157 Id. at 1398. 
 158 Id. at 1397. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 1398. 
 162 See id. at 1397–98. 
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cost in one year.163 They claimed that Rose Acre’s discounts diminished after it 
acquired the business of new supermarket chains.164 The plaintiffs supported 
their claim with evidence of Rose Acre’s predatory intent. This included the 
president’s statement to a rival—“We are going to run you out of the egg 
business. Your days are numbered”—and the company’s treasurer indicating, 
in response to a question about the company’s pricing, that its costs of 
production had nothing to do with its prices.165 At trial, the jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiffs, but the judge granted Rose Acre’s motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because the verdict was not supported 
by objective economic indicators.166 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed,167 rejecting reliance on intent in the 
process.168 The court began by observing the problem of separating aggressive 
competition from predatory pricing and noting three ways courts make this 
distinction: (1) scrutinizing the price–cost relationship, (2) focusing on the 
defendant’s intent, and (3) examining the market conditions and the 
corresponding feasibility of recoupment.169 The court favored using the third 
approach and concluded that “intent plays no useful role in this kind of 
litigation.”170 Specifically, it preferred focusing initially on the feasibility of 
recoupment as a means of determining whether predation was possible, 
without requiring a difficult examination of the defendant’s costs and prices.171 
If predation is not feasible, the court need not inquire into the specifics of 
prices and costs because the law should not be concerned with predation that is 
unlikely to be successful.172 Even if a company intended to engage in predatory 
pricing, “it [would be] bootless for the legal system to intervene” where such a 
scheme would fail, because it would be unprofitable and, therefore, self-
deterring; even repeated unsuccessful attempts would be beneficial to 
consumers.173 
 
 163 Id. at 1398. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See id. at 1398–99. 
 166 Id. at 1397, 1399. 
 167 Id. at 1408. 
 168 See id. at 1400–04. 
 169 See id. at 1400–01. 
 170 Id. at 1401. 
 171 See id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
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The court further argued that “[i]ntent does not help to separate competition 
from attempted monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard 
competition.”174 The court took the evidence presented in the trial court as a 
prime example. It explained that the statement of Rose Acre’s president was 
completely consistent with hard competition and that the treasurer’s statement 
really showed that Rose Acre was a “price taker,” rather than a monopolist.175 
Nonetheless, these were the types of statements that lawyers and jurors were 
likely to mistake for a smoking gun.176 The court argued that confusing 
evidence of this nature also complicated litigation by increasing the parties’ 
focus on the discovery of this type of information.177 It concluded that 
“[s]tripping intent away brings the real economic questions to the fore at the 
same time as it streamlines antitrust litigation” and therefore held that intent 
was not a basis for liability in a predatory pricing case.178 Because Rose Acre 
sold in a nearly perfectly competitive market, in which it could not hope to 
achieve and sustain a large-enough market share to recoup, the court affirmed 
the district court’s judgment in favor of the company based on a finding that 
recoupment was impossible.179 
These cases from the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
represented the split that existed at the time of Brooke Group. 
B. Intent After Brooke Group 
The role of intent in predatory pricing law is somewhat unclear after 
Brooke Group. On the one hand, the Court in Brooke Group did not explicitly 
disavow any consideration of intent. On the other hand, elements of the 
decision seemed to implicitly adopt the Barry Wright–Occam’s razor view that 
intent simply has no role in predatory pricing analysis. The latter interpretation 
of the decision seems to have weighed heavily on lower courts. 
First, Brooke Group does not expressly reject any consideration of 
intent.180 Some of the Court’s language even suggests that intent may still be 
 
 174 Id. at 1402. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Cf. id. (“[T]ake Lois Rust’s statement that Rose Acre’s prices were unrelated to its costs. Plaintiffs 
treat this as a smoking gun. Far from it, such a statement reveals Rose Acre to be a price taker.”). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See id. at 1403–04. 
 180 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738a, at 168–69 (“Brooke holds that no matter what the defendant’s 
anticompetitive intent, likelihood of recoupment must be established by objective evidence. . . . Clearly, intent 
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highly relevant but is simply not at issue in its review of the case. Importantly, 
the Court states, “[T]he essence of [a predatory pricing] claim . . . is . . . [that a] 
business rival has priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to 
eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control over 
prices in the relevant market.”181 The Court’s opinion therefore might be read 
to regard intent as a crucial element of a predatory pricing claim. Such a view 
seems to be supported by the Court’s holding: 
Liggett has failed to demonstrate competitive injury as a matter of 
law . . . because its proof is flawed in a critical respect . . . . 
No inference of recoupment is sustainable on this record, 
because no evidence suggests that Brown & Williamson—whatever 
its intent in introducing black and whites may have been—was likely 
to obtain the power to raise the prices for generic cigarettes above a 
competitive level.182 
This holding undoubtedly preempts any test for predatory pricing that relies on 
intent as the ultimate touchstone.183 However, these aspects of the opinion are 
certainly consistent with the view that intent is still critical—or at least 
relevant—to a predatory pricing inquiry and that it was simply not discussed in 
the case because Brown & Williamson’s intent was not at issue in the appeal. 
On the other hand, the Court’s opinion might be interpreted to preclude 
consideration of intent. The Court’s holding itself stresses the importance of 
objective market conditions and generally disregards the presence of an 
improper intent. And elsewhere the Court’s discussion seems to disapprove of 
reliance on intent.184 Also notable is the lack of weight the Court affords to 
 
evidence cannot be used as a substitute for objective evidence of pricing below the relevant measure of cost. 
Nevertheless, it might be relevant in other ways.”). In fact, the Court in Brooke Group cites neither Barry 
Wright nor Rose Acre Farms but does cite Inglis, albeit on a general, ancillary matter. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. 
at 221 (citing William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 181 Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
 182 Id. at 231–32 (emphasis added). 
 183 See  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738a, at 168–69. 
 184 See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225 (“Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against 
another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.”). The Court was also dismissive 
of its previous decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), which it noted “has 
often been interpreted to permit liability for primarily-line price discrimination on a mere showing that the 
defendant intended to harm competition or produced a declining price structure.” Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 
221. The Court stated that Utah Pie has been criticized extensively on that account but explained that it did 
“not regard the Utah Pie case itself as having the full significance attributed to it by its detractors.” Id. Though 
the Court did not overrule Utah Pie, it limited the holding from the case to a finding that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed the opinion as “an early judicial inquiry . . . [that] 
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seemingly strong evidence of intent.185 Though some of the evidence of intent 
presented at trial consisted merely of statements that Brown & Williamson 
wanted to “speed up Liggett’s demise” and “put a lid on Liggett,”186 the bulk 
of it consisted of detailed market analysis and plans produced by Brown & 
Williamson’s senior officers.187 However, the strongest factor that supports this 
interpretation is the Court’s enunciation of the “two prerequisites to recovery” 
in predatory pricing claims—(1) below-cost pricing and (2) likelihood of 
recoupment.188 Though ostensibly these are only prerequisites189—and not the 
only requirements—the Court seems to treat them as dispositive.190 In fact, the 
Court’s statement of these requirements immediately follows its statement that 
“the essence of [a predatory pricing claim is that a] business rival has priced its 
products in an unfair manner with an object to eliminate or retard competition 
and thereby gain and exercise control over prices in the relevant market.”191 
Though the Court does not cite the cases expressly eliminating consideration of 
intent, its treatment of these requirements seems to implicitly adopt the 
Occam’s razor view. And taken together, these factors suggest that intent is 
irrelevant to predatory pricing claims. Lower courts certainly seem to think so; 
they rarely mention intent and consistently speak of Brooke Group’s 
prerequisites as the only two elements of a predatory pricing claim.192 
 
did not purport to set forth explicit, general standards for establishing a violation of the Robinson–Patman 
Act.” Id. 
 185 Compare Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 (M.D.N.C. 
1990) (“The[] documents, indicating B & W’s anticompetitive intent, are more voluminous and detailed than 
any other reported case. This evidence not only indicates B & W wanted to injure Liggett, it also details an 
extensive plan to slow the growth of the generic cigarette segment.”), aff’d, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), aff’d sub 
nom. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), and Glazer, supra note 
92, at 610–13 (describing the strength of the intent evidence in Brooke Group), with Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 
231 (“Brown & Williamson’s entry into the generic segment could be regarded as precompetitive in intent as 
well as effect . . . .”), and Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda–Turner Test: The 
Recoupment Standard in Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 580 (1994) (suggesting the intent evidence in 
Brooke Group was more notable for its volume than for its strength). Regardless of how the intent evidence in 
Brooke Group has been characterized, and despite the Court’s ultimate holding, the Court found that there was 
sufficient evidence of predatory intent to support a jury finding on the issue. 509 U.S. at 231. 
 186 Glazer, supra note 92, at 610. 
 187 Id. at 610–11. 
 188 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24. 
 189 Id. at 222. 
 190 See id. at 226–27 (“These prerequisites to recovery are not easy to establish, but they are not artificial 
obstacles to recovery . . . . It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low 
that antitrust suits themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.” (emphases added)). 
 191 Id. at 222. 
 192 Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883, 898 (9th Cir. 2008); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 695–98 (7th Cir. 2006); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 
431 F.3d 917, 932 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003); Beech-
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Thus, the status of intent in predatory pricing cases is ambiguous. Brooke 
Group did foreclose the type of intent-based predatory pricing standards used 
in Inglis and McGahee, but it did not expressly disavow all consideration of 
intent. However, it did suggest to lower courts that its two prerequisites were 
the only two elements of a predatory pricing claim. Courts below have seized 
upon that suggestion, effectively ending any consideration of a defendant’s 
intent in predatory pricing cases. The next Part discusses why, in the future, 
courts should decline to follow such an interpretation and should insist upon 
intent as a third requirement for a predatory pricing claim. 
IV.  ADDING AN INTENT REQUIREMENT 
While the Court’s opinion in Brooke Group effectively ended any 
consideration of intent in predatory pricing cases, it did not mandate such a 
result. This Part argues that it is a mistake for courts to read Brooke Group in 
such a manner and that they should begin including predatory intent as a third 
requirement. Courts have eliminated an intent requirement for two reasons. 
First, they have had difficulty grasping what intent means in predatory pricing 
cases.193 Second, the alternative standards considered pre-Brooke Group were 
either intent based or discarded intent altogether.194 This Part explains that 
neither explanation presents an obstacle to the inclusion of intent in predatory 
pricing analysis. It first clarifies what intent should mean in predatory pricing 
cases and addresses evidentiary issues. It then explains why intent is a key 
component of any predatory pricing inquiry and that reintroducing an intent 
requirement into the current legal framework would make the law more 
coherent and would function as a limiting principle. 
 
Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 69 F. App’x 350, 352 (9th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 
F.3d 1237, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002); Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir. 2000); Nat’l 
Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1998); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. 
Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998); Astra Media Grp., LLC v. Clear Channel Taxi Media, 
LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 414 F. App’x 334 (2d Cir. 
2011); Arnold Chevrolet LLC v. Tribune Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 172, 182–83 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 193 See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (struggling with 
whether intent means “intent to harm” or some other form of intent). 
 194 Compare McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503–04 (11th Cir. 1988) (embracing 
intent as the touchstone of a claim, with shifting presumptions based on the defendant’s costs), with A.A. 
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]ntent plays no useful 
role in this kind of litigation.”). 
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A. Meaning of Predatory Intent 
Framing the issue of intent has been a source of difficulty in predatory 
pricing law: there are various ways of doing so, and courts have not always 
been clear in this regard. And the manner in which it is framed has major 
consequences. For example, if framed as an intent to harm or destroy 
competitors, penalizing such intent runs the risk of discouraging 
competition;195 if framed as an intent to undertake the price cuts at issue, intent 
is meaningless196—after all, companies do not accidentally lower their prices. 
To avoid potential difficulties, one must therefore identify what precisely is 
meant by a requirement of predatory intent before making the case for its 
addition and elaborating on how it might be employed. 
1. Basic Meaning 
The meaning of intent flows naturally from the definition of predatory 
pricing “as a price reduction that is profitable [i.e., rational] only because of 
the added market power the predator gains from eliminating, disciplining, or 
otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or potential rival.”197 
Viewed from this lens, predatory intent means the intent to profit through a 
price reduction only by producing exclusionary or disciplining effects. Thus, 
predatory intent would be present where the theory of profitability behind a 
company’s price reduction is that it would exclude other companies from the 
market or cause them to acquiesce to the company’s later elevated prices. 
Predatory intent would be absent where the company’s price reduction is 
backed by any other rationale. 
 
 195 See Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 (“[A] desire to extinguish one’s rivals is entirely consistent 
with, often is the motive behind, competition.”); 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 407–08 
(“‘[S]pecific intent’ clearly cannot include: the mere intention to prevail over one’s rivals. To declare that 
intention unlawful would defeat the antitrust goal of encouraging competition on the merits, which is heavily 
motivated by such an intent.”); Edward H. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary 
Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373, 395 (1974) (“Plainly . . . the 
‘specific intent’ required in attempt cases is not simply a subjective intent to prevail in the market. Instead, it is 
the intent to indulge in means that are in some sense untoward.”). 
 196 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 409 (“[I]f intent equals conduct, then the 
separate intent requirement itself becomes superfluous and can be abandoned.”). 
 197 Bolton, et al., supra note 28, at 2242; accord Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (describing predatory pricing as reducing prices with the object of eliminating or 
inhibiting competition); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22 (“[P]redatory pricing involves an 
immediate sacrifice of profits through unreasonably low prices. These low prices destroy rivals or intimidate 
them from selling at a lower price than the defendant charges. Then follows a ‘recoupment’ period . . . . In 
order for predatory pricing of this variety to be a rational strategy, recoupment gains, discounted to present 
value, must exceed the immediate losses from the predatory campaign.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Therefore, a predatory intent is essentially the absence of a business 
justification.198 Courts have recognized business-justification defenses in some 
situations, apparently realizing that pure cost-based rules sweep too broadly.199 
However, they have failed to provide any clear guidelines.200 For instance, 
courts have recognized promotional pricing as a possible business 
justification,201 but beyond that it is unclear what defenses might be 
available.202 Despite some general language in cases since Brooke Group 
pertaining to business justifications,203 courts have not provided any additional 
guidance. As a result, some commentators have suggested definite recognition 
of a number of business justifications, such as defensive price-cutting, 
promotional pricing, learning by doing, and network externalities.204 To the 
extent that business-justification defenses are recognized as affirmative 
defenses, the burden is generally on the defendant to establish them.205 
Even if the number of recognized business justifications increases, it will 
necessarily be on an ad hoc basis.206 Given the relative infrequency of 
predatory pricing cases, it is unlikely that the law relating to business 
justifications will develop in an expedient and predictable manner. Thus, if 
more emphasis is placed on business-justification defenses, the law on what 
 
 198 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274 (“A business justification or efficiencies defense serves as a 
means of eliminating cases where below-cost pricing by a firm with market power is likely to be welfare-
enhancing, rather than predatory. In these cases, the sacrifice of present profits through low pricing is justified 
for reasons other than exclusion or disciplining of rivals.” (footnote omitted)). Cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 725 (1980) (“[E]vidence of a respondent’s purpose may reveal the extent to which there 
are legitimate business justifications underpinning the respondent’s conduct.”). 
 199 See LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 71–76; Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274 (“The defense . . . serves 
as a necessary shield against an overly inclusive legal rule.”). 
 200 LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 71. 
 201 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 746a, at 271–75; see also Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 
F.2d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 1984) (price competition in Portland gas market); Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. 
Buffalo Evening News, Inc. 601 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1979) (free samples of Sunday papers). 
 202 See  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 748, at 301 (proposing recognition of a “meeting-
competition” defense in certain situations); Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 715 (arguing that meeting 
competition should not be a defense where the alleged predator prices below marginal cost). 
 203 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000) (“A Section 2 
defendant’s proffered business justification is the most important factor in determining whether its challenged 
conduct is not competition on the merits.”); Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“To determine whether conduct is exclusionary, we look to the proffered business justification for the 
act.”). These cases recite language pertaining to business justifications in their general discussion of section 2 
claims but do not address the issue in their predatory pricing analyses. 
 204 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274–82. 
 205 Id. at 2274. 
 206 Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–79, 301–05 (describing uncertainty with 
even the most basic business-justification defense and suggesting fairly narrow circumstances in which a 
meeting-competition defense might apply). 
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constitutes such a justification will not become settled anytime in the near 
future. Recognizing intent as the converse of a business justification 
simultaneously places the burden on the plaintiff to prove the absence of a 
business justification and settles the question of what constitutes a business 
justification. 
2. Evidentiary Issues 
Evidentiary issues with the proof of intent appear to have been a driving 
force behind its elimination from predatory pricing analysis. A major objection 
to utilizing intent in predatory pricing cases is that plaintiffs’ attempts to prove 
intent complicate litigation by expanding the scope of discovery to produce 
supposedly smoking-gun-type statements in which the defendant evinces a 
desire to destroy his competitor and that these statements, once produced, 
distract and mislead the jury, ultimately reducing the accuracy of decisions.207 
While these concerns may be valid under a different conception of intent, they 
are inapt for the inquiry this Comment proposes. It is quite right to express 
concern over the potential for statements such as “Let’s pound them into the 
sand”208 or “We are going to run you out of the egg business”209 to mislead the 
jury. After all, the desire to prevail over one’s rivals is completely consistent 
with hard competition—a principal goal of antitrust law210—and the 
presentation of such statements may give the impression of improper motive 
where the only motive is to outcompete one’s rivals. 
But the concern with such evidence is the same that the law has with any 
nonprobative evidence.211 Such statements are simply not probative of the 
issue of intent as it is described in this Comment—that is, they are not 
probative of a company’s theory of profitability underlying its price cuts. 
Because they do not affect the likelihood of predatory intent, they may be 
 
 207 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989); AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738, at 168–71. 
 208 U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 209 Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 210 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 407–08. 
 211 Compare  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738c, at 175 (“To encourage judges and juries to 
wallow in unprobative data invites the twin mischiefs of (1) burdening litigation with thousands of documents 
about the firm’s motives and calculations and (2) inviting quixotic results.” (emphasis added)), with RONALD 
L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 195–96, 327 
(6th ed. 2007) (explaining the doctrines of logical relevance and legal irrelevance). 
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inadmissible for lack of relevance.212 And, to the extent that such statements 
are relevant to the issue of intent, they may still properly be excluded under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.213 Courts, therefore, already have the tools to 
prevent these types of statements from burdening litigation and manipulating 
results. Intent should not present any special issue so long as courts adhere to 
the proper notion of intent. 
Judges would simply have to use their discretion, bearing in mind that a 
simple desire to crush competitors by outcompeting them is not relevant to the 
inquiry—the goal must be to exclude or coerce. For example, it would likely 
be appropriate to consider private consultants’ reports of the type in Inglis, 
provided that there is a causal link between suggested strategies and those 
actually adopted.214 Evidence, such as that in McGahee, that a firm 
investigated competitors’ financials prior to implementing its series of price 
cuts215 may also be relevant. At the same time, statements, such as those in 
McGahee, merely showing that a firm wanted to crush competitors216 would 
not be relevant. A company’s statements and memoranda might in some 
circumstances be pertinent to the intent inquiry, but they would have to go 
beyond merely stating the goal of crushing the competition to stating the 
company’s projections and expectations for how it will profit from business 
decisions. Additionally, proof of intent could center around companies’ 
business and financial records.217 In the absence of foul play, this information 
should always be easily available218 and should provide sufficient information 
from which to glean the defendant’s business rationale for its prices. Reliance 
on these documents is unlikely to complicate litigation beyond its present state 
 
 212 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”); id. R. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). 
 213 E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming the exclusion of memoranda in which the defendant discussed ways to “shut down” and “kill” the 
plaintiff). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. 
EVID. 403. Because of their tangential probative value and tendency to mislead the jury, statements such as 
those in R.J. Reynolds seem to be of the variety that should routinely be excluded under Rule 403. 
 214 The court’s treatment of the evidence in Inglis, however, was likely appropriate. See William Inglis & 
Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 215 See McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 216 See id. 
 217 Cf. Herb, supra note 59, at 1605 (proposing a practical test for predatory pricing claims involving the 
examination of companies’ internal records). 
 218 Id. 
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and should focus the inquiry on relatively dry business data that is unlikely to 
mislead or inflame juries. 
Whatever the type of evidence relied upon, to satisfy the burden of 
production, the plaintiff would have to present some evidence tending to show 
that the defendant’s theory of profitability behind its price cuts was based on 
the ability to exclude or coerce. It could satisfy this burden either by providing 
direct evidence of such intent or by demonstrating the inconsistency of the 
scheme with legitimate business justifications, such as promotional pricing, 
learning by doing, or network effects. If satisfied, the defendant would have to 
rebut with some evidence that its prices were motivated by business objectives 
other than excluding or coercing. The issue would then be litigated in a 
standard fashion; there would be no need for allocating the burden differently 
based on the defendant’s price–cost relationship. Whatever type of evidence is 
presented, so long as courts keep in mind the proper definition of intent, the 
inquiry would be unlikely to complicate litigation further and should focus on 
information that is unlikely to mislead or inflame juries. 
B. Why Intent? 
Pre-Brooke Group cases addressing the issue of intent provided some 
arguments for considering intent in predatory pricing analysis. But because 
those cases relied on a somewhat different conception of intent and utilized it 
in a different manner than this Comment proposes, they did not fully address 
the reasons for its inclusion. This section explains that intent is a critical 
element in predatory pricing analysis both to properly implement the antitrust 
statutes and to provide appropriate limitations upon the scope of predatory 
pricing law. 
1. Statutory Requirements 
The primary statutes under which predatory pricing claims are brought219—
section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robinson–Patman Act—support an intent 
 
 219 These are not the only statutes under which predatory pricing claims might arise. For example, claims 
may also arise under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, e.g., E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 96 
F.T.C. 653, 653, 655 (1980), or under state unfair competition laws, e.g., Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 
F.3d 1244, 1244–47 (10th Cir. 2008). It is also possible for a predatory pricing claim to be brought under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act as a claim of completed monopolization through a scheme of predation; intent 
would not be as relevant to a completed monopolization claim because the fact of completion would establish 
its anticompetitive nature. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 431–32 (2d Cir. 
1945), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 
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requirement. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to “attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations.”220 “[T]o demonstrate attempted monopolization a 
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”221 Because a violation 
of section 2 requires a specific intent to monopolize, consideration of intent is 
certainly necessary in predatory pricing analysis under the statute. The only 
questions are what constitutes a specific intent and how to assess it. 
The specific intent required by section 2 developed by analogy to the 
criminal law of attempt.222 As Judge Hand described: 
[C]onduct falling short of monopoly, is not illegal unless it is part of 
a plan to monopolize, or to gain such other control of a market as is 
equally forbidden. To make it so, the plaintiff must prove what in the 
criminal law is known as a “specific intent”; an intent which goes 
beyond the mere intent to do the act.223 
A major purpose of a specific-intent requirement, then, is to confine the reach 
of the attempt offense to conduct that presents an actual threat of achieving its 
prohibited goals.224 This analogy therefore supports the idea that specific intent 
should focus on the business rationale, or subjective purpose, for the alleged 
predatory prices.225 The purpose behind the disputed price cuts is crucial in 
determining whether they threaten monopolization or are consistent with hard 
competition. Only where there is predatory intent—or no business justification 
for below-cost prices—is there a threat of monopolization.226 It is important to 
emphasize that the intent required is the intent to monopolize.227 The idea 
 
1246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 28, 30 U.S.C.); 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 4, ¶ 805a, at 406. 
 220 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 221 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 222 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1982); 3B 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 804, at 403. 
 223 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431–32. 
 224 See Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1027 (“[S]pecific intent [in section 2] is used to confine the reach of an attempt 
claim to conduct threatening monopolization.”); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 341 (“The 
purpose of the criminal attempt offense is to save society from the dangers presented by persons who 
demonstrated their evil proclivities but who fell short of their criminal goals through miscalculation or 
fortuity.”). 
 225 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 409–10. 
 226 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274–82 (grounding several proposed business justifications in 
their lack of threat to competition). 
 227 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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behind business justifications is that there are some legitimate rationales for 
below-cost prices that make them unlikely to be harmful to competition and 
thus unlikely to lead to monopoly.228 In other words, when there is a business 
justification—and thus no predatory intent—the price cutting is part of a plan 
to compete, not to monopolize the plan of which the price cuts are a part is not 
to monopolize, but to compete. This is a key distinction: the goal of the 
Sherman Act—and of the antitrust laws generally—is to prevent monopoly 
while encouraging free competition.229 To avoid obfuscating this distinction, 
the specific intent required by the statute should be construed to mean the type 
of intent this Comment proposes. 
The problem is that courts, consciously or unconsciously, have bought into 
the Barry Wright–Occam’s razor view that intent is inferable from objective 
economic conditions, and so it is unnecessary to consider it separately.230 This 
is apparent from the fact that they continue to recite the specific intent 
requirement when speaking of section 2 generally, but when they begin 
analyzing predatory pricing issues, they mention only Brooke Group’s two 
prerequisites.231 Note how precisely the two Brooke Group prerequisites map 
onto the two non-intent requirements of a section 2 claim: below-cost pricing 
matches closely with “predatory or anticompetitive conduct,” and feasibility of 
recoupment matches closely with “a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power.”232 The Brooke Group prerequisites simply do not capture 
the specific intent element. If they did, there would be no need for any 
consideration of a defendant’s business justifications. Rather than actually 
capturing intent, the two-pronged approach simply presumes the requirement is 
satisfied, sometimes allowing the defendant to show otherwise.233 This 
elimination of intent contrasts with judicial interpretation of other statutes that 
 
 228 See  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–72, 274, 301–03. 
 229 See 1 id. ¶ 103a, at 42–49; E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY 
AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 16 (5th ed. 2003). 
 230 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that 
intent is superfluous and potentially distracting). 
 231 E.g., John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2009); Cascade Health Solutions v. 
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113–15 
(10th Cir. 2003); Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2000); Astra Media Grp., 
LLC v. Clear Channel Taxi Media, LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 414 F. App’x 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 232 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 233 See  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738a, at 169–70, 170 n.7 (noting that lack of intent has 
occasionally appeared relevant in courts’ holdings that below-cost pricing did not amount to an antitrust 
violation). 
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impose harsh penalties for engaging in proscribed conduct.234 Consistency with 
the statute, and judicial determinations in other areas, should dictate requiring 
intent as a separate element. 
While the Robinson–Patman Act does not provide as strong a textual basis 
for an intent element, it too should be construed to require intent. The 
Robinson–Patman Act prohibits price discrimination “where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly.”235 As the Court in Brooke Group emphasized, “By its terms, the 
Robinson–Patman Act condemns price discrimination only to the extent that it 
threatens to injure competition.”236 Furthermore, it provides statutory defenses 
for price discrimination based on differences in costs,237 changing market 
conditions,238 and good-faith price matching.239 These explicit exceptions 
cover a good number of potential business justifications and go well beyond 
those definitively recognized in predatory pricing law.240 “Thus, ‘the 
Robinson–Patman Act should be construed consistently with broader policies 
of the antitrust laws’”241—that is, consistently with the Sherman Act and 
consistently with the goal of preventing monopoly while encouraging hard 
 
 234 Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615–16 (1994) (interpreting the National Firearms Act to 
require a mens rea element where the statute was silent); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) 
(“We hold that mere omission from § 641 of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that 
element from the crimes denounced.”). The Sherman Act, like the statutes at issue in Staples and Morissette, 
does impose criminal penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). While predatory pricing cases are not pursued as 
criminal actions, cf. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 229, at 68 (noting that criminal prosecution will 
only be pursued for “per se violations” or cases in which a defendant has willfully violated the law), potential 
penalties are extremely harsh. 
 235 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
 236 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993). 
 237 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (“[N]othing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due 
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or 
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . . .”). 
 238 See id. (“[N]othing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response 
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not 
limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales 
under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.”). 
 239 See id. § 13(b) (“[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus 
made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers 
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a 
competitor.”). 
 240 Note that meeting competition is not even a clear-cut business justification in predatory pricing. See  
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–79, 301–05. 
 241 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 220 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 
(1979)). 
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competition.242 To do so, it should be read to require an element of intent in 
predatory pricing cases.243 
2. Intent as a Limiting Principle 
Typically, considerations of intent in predatory pricing law have been 
thought to reduce the burden on plaintiffs244 and to produce more false 
positives. But such impressions are largely of intent-based standards. This 
should not be the case under this Comment’s conception of intent. Focusing on 
intent as a business’s rationale for its prices—whether it intended to profit by 
excluding or coercing rivals, or had some other purpose consistent with 
competition—would not punish firms for striving to outcompete their rivals. 
Furthermore, requiring intent as an additional element, rather than as a 
substitute for more objective, cost-based tools, would not reduce the burden on 
plaintiffs but would increase it. 
Intent is an essential component of a complete definition of predatory 
pricing. Definitions that do not mention, or at least allude to, intent tend to 
identify the concept very generally and then seek to determine on an ad hoc 
basis which prices should be deemed predatory and nonpredatory, 
respectively.245 This reveals that price- and cost-based tests leave holes;246 
 
 242 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 243 Note that the Act places the burden on the defendant to prove certain statutory defenses. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13(a)–(b). This might suggest that the burden of proving a nonpredatory intent would be on the defendant. 
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 2006). However, as this 
Comment has explained, intent is a critical element of the definition of predatory pricing. As such, intent 
should be part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, and not merely a defense. Similarly, the Act does not place 
the burden on the defendant to establish the absence of the Brooke Group prerequisites, though neither is 
inherent in the term “price discrimination.” 
 244 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1399–1402 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(suggesting that intent evidence resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and will frequently lead to false 
positives); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (suggesting that a 
standard that focused on “intent to harm” would almost always seem to be satisfied); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 4, ¶ 738b, at 171–73 (suggesting that consideration of intent is more likely to result in a finding of 
illegality); cf. Herb, supra note 59, at 1605 (proposing a “Practical Test” for predatory pricing, which 
examines the business’s own calculations and data, intended to lessen the financial and evidentiary burdens on 
plaintiffs). 
 245 Compare Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 (referencing the “object” of a firm’s pricing strategy in its 
definition of a predatory pricing claim under the Robinson–Patman Act), and Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 
1399 (noting that “the gravamen” of a predatory pricing claim under either section 2 or the Robinson–Patman 
Act “is that the aggressor sold goods for too little money, hoping to cripple or discipline rivals so that it might 
sell its wares for a monopoly price later”), with Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 231–32 (attempting to identify the 
situations in which predatory pricing exists without giving a clear definition of predatory pricing before 
holding intent irrelevant), and  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22 (explaining that predatory 
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specifically, they are only “negative indicator[s],” whereas intent is a “positive 
indicator.”247 Focusing on below-cost pricing and the feasibility of recoupment 
helps to identify situations in which there was no predatory pricing and 
establishes situations in which predatory pricing may have occurred, but it 
does not affirmatively establish the presence of a predatory scheme. 
Proponents of cost-based rules seem to recognize this much but seem satisfied 
that such rules are sufficiently tailored so that predation may be presumed if 
they are satisfied.248 The incompleteness of the two Brooke Group 
prerequisites presents a major problem of overinclusion. Business-justification 
defenses limit this problem to some degree but provide an imperfect solution. 
There are no clear standards for when they might apply,249 which places a great 
burden on defendants: they must establish that a business justification should 
be recognized and that their conduct conforms to that justification. As this 
Comment has discussed, any rationale for a business’s below-cost prices, other 
than to exclude or coerce rivals, renders them procompetitive. As a result, it 
does not make much sense to recognize a narrow number of business 
justifications and to place the burden on the defendant to establish them. 
Putting the burden on the plaintiff to establish predatory intent better reinforces 
the distinction between anticompetitive conduct and hard competition. 
Requiring intent as an additional element not only would provide a proper 
limit on the ultimate scope of the law but also may decrease the burdens of 
litigation. Because intent would be a third element of a prima facie case, it 
would provide an additional mechanism for defeating meritless claims; claims 
could be defeated because the plaintiff failed to establish below-cost pricing,250 
feasibility of recoupment,251 or predatory intent. At least in some situations, 
this might decrease the burdens of litigating the Brooke Group prerequisites. 
For example, defining the relevant market is often a difficult task and may 
 
pricing exists under “certain conditions [where] low prices may have anticompetitive effects,” rather than 
providing a clear definition of the practice). 
 246 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 284–85 (stating that cost-based rules involve purely static economic 
analysis that “fail[s] to account for . . . intertemporal attributes of predatory pricing”); see also E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 727 (1980) (“It is simply unrealistic to divorce conduct from intent.”). 
 247 Beck, supra note 96, at 1269. 
 248 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 712. 
 249 For a discussion of the limited and sporadic availability of business justifications, see generally  
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–79, 301–05; and LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 71–
76. 
 250 E.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding for the 
defendant because the plaintiff did not prove below-cost pricing). 
 251 E.g., Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 478 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding for the defendant 
because the plaintiff did not satisfy the recoupment prong). 
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determine whether the prices at issue are below or above cost.252 The relevant-
market issue may have added importance because of the lack of uniformity 
among the circuits with respect to the appropriate measure of cost.253 An intent 
requirement may decrease the importance of vehemently contesting this issue: 
if intent cannot be established, this and other points are nonissues. Adding an 
element of intent may therefore reduce the costs of litigation, which could 
reduce the potential for strategic misuse of predatory pricing lawsuits.254 
Requiring intent as an element of predatory pricing may therefore provide 
important limits on the scope of the law and minimize current problems with 
predatory pricing litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Comment has discussed, the task of separating normal, competitive 
low prices from anticompetitive, predatory low prices is often difficult, and the 
dividing line that results is seemingly illusory. Nonetheless, making a clear 
distinction is necessary. Given the persistence of predatory pricing doctrine 
over time, and recent scholarship advocating its expansion, it is unlikely that 
the difficulties of the doctrine will vanish. 
This Comment has advocated a novel approach to limiting the scope of 
predatory pricing law. While traditionally intent has been used to produce 
more favorable outcomes for plaintiffs, this Comment has argued that intent 
can be utilized to provide a major limitation on the scope of the law. Doing so 
will actually increase the burden on plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases and 
produce more favorable outcomes for defendants, all else equal. At the same 
time, this proposal may be consistently employed alongside other 
commentators’ proposals, which advocate broadening the scope of the law—to 
the extent that they are consistent with Brooke Group. This is important 
because if such proposals gain traction with the courts, intent may still be used 
as a means of limiting those new, broad rules without the necessity of 
overruling them. Thus, future development of the law may make intent an even 
more important limiting principle than it presently is. 
 
 252 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 933–35 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court [has] emphasized that a product market may have submarkets and the definition of a market or 
submarket focuses on economic realities and industry practice.” (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 325 (1962))). 
 253 See generally LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–8 (discussing the relevant cost used in various circuits). 
 254 See Crane, supra note 12, at 26–27 (explaining that the expense involved in predatory pricing litigation 
makes the initiation of lawsuits an effective means of controlling rivals’ pricing behavior). 
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Finally, requiring intent as an additional element is consistent with current 
law. As a result, courts should not have to alter any existing law to implement 
this Comment’s proposal. They can simply add the requirement as soon as the 
issue arises. Doing so may provide an immediate and effective limit on 
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